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The expression of literary fiction is potentially unlimited. It could be said, like Searle, that 
potentially any text whatever can occur in fiction. By contrast, the contents of non-fictional 
discourses always have some kind of limits. Starting from this basic premise, this article will 
defend that the primary semiotic correlate that explains this difference can be found at the 
level of what Umberto Eco calls «signification» (that is, the culturally codified link that, within 
the sign, binds the planes of expression and content together). Thus, a theoretical structural 
difference between fiction and non-fiction is that in each case meaning is created following 
different signification logics. Whereas in non-fictional texts the signification link is governed 
by predetermined norms that arise from a series of real social and cultural interactions, in 
texts of literary fiction, which have no obligatory commitment to real world, this signification 
link is managed as if it were a potential in a virtually unlimited way. 
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La expresión literaria ficcional es potencialmente ilimitada. Podría decirse, al modo de Searle, 
que potencialmente cualquier texto puede ocurrir en ficción. Sin embargo, los contenidos de 
los discursos no ficcionales siempre tienen algún tipo de límite. Partiendo de esta premisa 
básica, en este artículo se defenderá que el correlato semiótico primario que explica esta 
diferencia se encuentra en el nivel de lo que Umberto Eco entiende por «significación» (es 
decir, el vínculo culturalmente codificado que, dentro del signo, une plano de la expresión y 
plano del contenido). Así, una diferencia teórica estructural entre ficción y no ficción es que 
ambas crean sentido siguiendo lógicas de significación diferentes. Mientras que en los textos 
no ficcionales el vínculo significante se rige por normas predeterminadas que surgen de una 
serie de interacciones sociales reales, en los textos literarios ficcionales dicho vínculo se 
administra de forma potencialmente ilimitada como si se tratara de un potencial. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
For several decades now, numerous theoretical approaches have discouraged 
establishing a clear distinction between fictional and non-fictional texts. Or, at least, they 
recommend not to establish rigid and restrictive borders between literary fiction and fiction 
understood in its broadest sense, as a cross-cutting resource to all possibilities of human 
communication. From Pavel's critique of what he called «segregationist approaches» (1986: 
11) to more recent pragmatic proposals (Walsh, 2007; Nielsen, Phelan, and Walsh, 2015), 
there is a certain tendency within fiction theory to dissolve the boundaries between literary 
fiction and the rest of communicative possibilities. Our goal in this article, however, is to 
defend the opposite position. Our goal is to demonstrate that, at least with respect to 
narrative literary fiction (I will leave aside poetry, theater and other types of non-literary 
fiction) 1  there is a structural difference between fictional discourse and the rest of 
communicative texts. This difference, as will be seen in the next few pages, is based on the 
potential infinity of fictional literary expression, which is absolutely exclusive to this 
communicative modality. We will defend that its theoretical trace can be first found in the 
primitive instance of human language, on the level that Umberto Eco calls «signification». 
 
 
1. THE POTENTIAL INFINITY OF FICTIONAL EXPRESSION 
 
As is well known, John Searle's article «The Logical Status of Fictional Discourse» 
(1975) has had a huge impact on fiction theory. Since its publication more than four decades 
ago with its central thesis of fictionality conceived in terms of pretended illocutionary acts, 
this text has generated hundreds of pages written by supporters and critics2. However, there 
is a fragment of that article which expresses what in my opinion is one of the key points of 
fiction, and that, as far as we know, has received little theoretical attention. It is an incidental 
phrase, meant as a clarification of little importance, but which expresses one of the 
                                                        
1 For reasons of clarity, in this article the term «fiction» will refer only to the specific fictional modality 
of narrative literary fiction unless stated otherwise. 
2 There are some authors extremely critical of Searle’s thesis (Cohn, 1999: 117; Martínez Bonati, 1992: 
61-69; Walton, 1990: 81-89; Doležel, 1998: 11). On the other hand, there are other authors who 
develop a pragmatic approach to fiction (Genette, 1993: 30-54; Pratt, 1977; Adams, 1985; Ohmann, 
1971; Pavel, 1986: 43, and in a certain sense, Ryan, 1991: 64-65) who follow to a greater or lesser 
degree Searle’s main theses, although they modify or even reformulate them. 
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fundamental distinguishing characteristics of literary fiction. Searle writes this sentence 
within the framework of a broader argument. In it, Searle rejects the idea that fiction, in spite 
of not fulfilling any of the felicity conditions of speech acts, has a completely differentiated 
way of signification. That is to say, despite the fact that fiction violates practically each and 
every one of the pragmatic rules that govern communication, fictional singularity is not based 
on a clearly differentiated way of creating meaning with respect to the rest of the 
communicative possibilities. Searle writes:  
 
That view is at least prima facie an impossible view since if it were true it would be 
impossible for anyone to understand a work of fiction without learning a new set 
of meanings for all the words and other elements contained in the work of 
fiction, and since any sentence whatever can occur in a work of fiction, in order to have the 
ability to read any work of fiction, a speaker of the language would have to learn 
the language all over again, since every sentence in the language would have both 
a fictional and a nonfictional meaning (Searle, 1975: 324).  
 
The italicized phrase is vital to understand the radical uniqueness of fiction with 
respect to any other type of discourse. Although at first glance that phrase may seem trivial, 
it is actually quite the opposite, since it is precisely this radical and potentially infinite freedom 
of fictional expression that distinguishes it to a far greater extent than any other element 
from the rest of communicative modalities. Let us think about it for a moment. Would there 
be any other kind of discourse which this phrase could be applied to literally, to its ultimate 
consequences? Could it be said, for example, that any sentence whatsoever can occur in 
scientific, legal or religious discourses? Could it be said, even, that any sentence whatsoever 
can occur in what could be called everyday speech discourse? Apart from fiction, could we find 
any communicative modality in which any sentence could potentially occur? In our opinion, 
the answer is no. 
In general, a discourse involves complex sets of norms that make it impossible for 
every possible phrase to have a place in it. It is hard to imagine that a sentence like «Excuse 
me, could you tell me where the nearest supermarket is?» could be part of a legal, scientific 
or religious discourse. Even the most informal types of discourse types have their own norms 
about what is suitable to say. Thus, it would be difficult to imagine a sentence like the 
following, «If two systems are in thermal equilibrium with a third system, they are in thermal 
equilibrium with each other», which corresponds to the zero principle of thermodynamics, 
in a daily conversation.  
However, in fictional discourse, as Searle points out, every sentence imaginable 
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could occur, at least potentially. There is no sentence that from the start and in itself could 
be considered inappropriate, unacceptable or even strange in a fictional text. Unlike the legal 
field, where a defect of form can annul an entire text, it is impossible to imagine a single 
sentence that would not have any place at all in a work of fiction, no matter the form of the 
sentence, its content or even the fact that it does not respect basic grammatical norms, as 
often happens in works like James Joyce’s Finnegans Wake (1939). Unlike in the rest of 
communicative modalities, every sentence imaginable could potentially occur in a work of 
fiction. 
But the uniqueness of fiction does not lie only in this ability to accommodate any 
sentence. This fact, in our opinion, would only be the consequence of a deeper theoretical 
circumstance. The potential infinite expression of fiction that Searle talks about translates, in 
our opinion, into the fact that any string of sentences (i.e., any text) can occur (could 
potentially occur) in fiction. The fundamental reason is that, with the exception of certain 
microfictions, the vast majority of fictional works are comprised of hundreds or even 
thousands of sentences, so the minimum unit of fictional analysis is the text. Thus, the 
potential infinity of fictional expression would imply not only that it easily has the capacity 
to accept sentences impossible to accommodate in any other communicative modality, such 
as the initial sentence of Finnegans Wake: «Riverrun, past Eve and Adam's, from swerve of 
shore to bend of bay, brings us by a commodius vicus of recirculation back to Howth Castle 
and Environs» (Joyce, 2012: 2); what the potential infinity of fictional expression really means 
is that it has a virtually unlimited capacity to accommodate any set of sentences, that is, any 
text. 
The point is, could a text be imagined which had no place at all in a work of literary 
fiction? Are there any limits to the textual content of a fictional work? Are there any limits 
to the way it can create and combine any kind of sentences? In other words, is there any 
textual content that could be rejected a priori as capable of being part of a work of fiction? 
In this case the answer would not be just «no», but something more complex. Of 
course, we are not attempting to say that any text, that literally anything, could be considered 
a work of fiction. In spite of the pragmatic approaches that consider fiction a cultural 
convention and therefore not essential and historically variable, a shopping list or a technical 
report on the state of a building would not in any case be considered a full work of fiction. 
The key point is that both contents, like any other ones imaginable, would be susceptible to 
forming part of a fictional text (or could be somehow integrated into it). That is, a work of 
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fiction could incorporate without any problem a shopping list, a report on the state of a 
building and, potentially, any kind of content. 
In this sense, the adverb «potentially» is hugely important. There is no doubt that it 
would be very rare to see certain types of content (the complete instructions of a DVD 
player, for instance) in a work of fiction. However, there is no textual content at all that could 
be excluded a priori and in a definitive way from being part of a work of fiction. Thus, not 
every single textual content could be considered fiction, but we could define fiction as that 
expressive modality with the ability to potentially accommodate every textual content 
imaginable. 
To the extent that it is accepted that fictional contents do not have any a priori 
limitations in regard to form or content, that the only limitations are the writer's narrative 
skills and the reader's ability to understand the text, it seems inevitable to accept that any text 
can occur in a fictional work. Potentially, a fictional work can be about any subject and can 
be written in any style, and any limitation to this potentially absolute expressive freedom of 
fiction can only be understood as a form of censorship. Extreme experimental works such 
as the aforementioned Finnegans Wake or the no less singular La Disparition (1969) by George 
Perec could only be conceived this way. Besides, only under this premise could the 
normalization and systematization of the impossible fictional worlds carried out by the so-
called «unnatural narratology»3 be assumed. 
However, beyond these extreme cases, the potentially infinite fictional expression 
can manifest itself in any work. This is so not only because of the absolute potential freedom 
of fiction in regard to form and content. It is also because in works of fiction that do not 
aspire to an avant-garde status we can find a large variety of possibilities of meaning 
generation which in the rest of discourses tend to be more limited. This is manifested in the 
presence in numerous works of resources such as multiperspectivism, omniscient narration, 
alterations of the narrative order (flashbacks, flash-forwards, etc.), the massive use of 
dialogues, or the use in a literal sense of verbs that describe interior processes (feeling, 
thinking, etc.), which are known as a whole as «symptoms of fictionality» (Hamburger, 1977: 
                                                        
3 According to Richardson, an unnatural narrative is «one that conspicuously violates conventions of 
standard narrative forms, in particular the conventions of nonfictional narratives, oral or written, and 
fictional modes like realism that model themselves on nonfictional narratives. Unnatural narratives 
furthermore follow fluid, changing conventions and create new narratological patterns in each work. 
In a phrase, unnatural narratives produce defamiliarization of the basic elements of narrative» (2011: 
34). For a wider description of the concept, see Shang’s article «Unnatural Narratology: Core Issues 
and Critical Debates» (2015). 
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56-111; Schaeffer and Ducrot, 318-320; Rifaterre, 1990: 29-30; Hempfer, 2004: 309 et seq.; 
Gorman, 2008: 166-167). 
As Ronen argues (1994: 79-80), these ways of creating meaning are not absolutely 
exclusive to fiction. But here what we want to highlight are the implications of the 
simultaneous presence of several of them in the same text. Thus, although a text such as a 
personal diary could use some of these resources, the simultaneous presence of several of 
them in the same text would be hardly possible in a non-fictional text and would be a sign 
of fiction’s potential expressive infinity. 
For all these reasons, and despite the fact that fiction shares many features with 
non-fictional discourses, the expressive resources of fiction are potentially unlimited. 
However, in the case of non-fiction, as will be seen in the following point, these expressive 
resources are always limited by their greater or lesser subjection to the real world. The key 
point is not just that this means that fictional expression is richer and more varied than non-
fictional expression. The fact that potentially any text can occur in fiction and only some can 
do so in non-fiction ultimately implies that the former, unlike the latter, controls in a 
potentially unlimited way how it generates meaning, that is to say, the way it signifies. 
 
 
2. «REALITY DISCOURSES» VS «FICTION DISCOURSES» 
 
Now then, what does this imply exactly? What would be the exact theoretical 
implications of this potentially unlimited ability of fiction to generate meaning that does not 
occur in the rest of the communicative modalities? Our hypothesis is that this peculiarity of 
fictional expression has its origin in a differentiated mode of signification (see point 4. 
below). However, before attempting to demonstrate this hypothesis it is necessary to 
establish a distinction between what we call «reality discourses» and «fiction discourses». It is 
a difference that essentially corresponds to Doležel's distinction between «world-imaging 
texts» or «I-texts» and «world-constructing texts» or «C-texts» (1998: 24). 
According to the Czech theorist, I-texts express states of things of a pre-existing 
world, so we can apply extensional values of truth and error to their contents. For example, 
a journalistic text is a clear example of an I-text because it talks about a certain state of things 
in a pre-existing world, the real world. And it is precisely the existence of this real world that 
allows us to establish values of truth and error based on the degree of coincidence between 
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what is expressed in the text and its real referent. For example, if a piece of news said that 
Hillary Clinton won the US presidential elections of 2016, it would be false because there is 
no reference in our world that matches with that statement. 
On the other hand, Doležel defines C-texts as those that, instead of expressing 
states of things in a pre-existing world, create a world through their enunciative display, so 
no truth or error values of an extensional type can be applied. This group would include texts 
ranging from scientific hypotheses (which do not express states of things of the real world, 
but possibilities that are projected in possible worlds) to fictional literary texts. According to 
Doležel, literary fiction texts are a type of C-texts. And he calls «textual poíesis» (1998: 23) this 
ability of C-texts to create worlds in their enunciative display instead of expressing 
preexisting states of things. 
As we said, we mostly agree with these two great typologies of texts, as well as with 
the fact that fictional works are a type of C-texts. However, there is an element that in our 
opinion distinguishes works of fiction from the rest of C-texts in a decisive way. This concept 
could be called, for lack of a better phrase, the «margin of expression of unreality». By this 
we mean that both I-texts that refer to false contents (that is, lies) and non-literary fictional 
C-texts, such as scientific hypotheses or macroeconomic forecasts, have limits when they 
express contents that do not match with real world. 
In the case of lies, this limit is determined by certain conditions of verisimilitude 
given by a real context. For example, if someone were late for an appointment because he 
got up late, he could say that his delay was due to traffic problems. In this case, the 
effectiveness of his lie (that is, the likelihood of being believed) would depend on a series of 
conditions derived from more or less empirical data of the real world, such as whether traffic 
jams are or are not common in that area. However, if that person says he arrived late because 
he was abducted by a UFO, then it is extremely unlikely that he would be believed. 
Something similar occurs with non-fiction C-texts (scientific hypotheses, 
macroeconomic forecasts, etc.). In this case, and even though they do not express states of 
things in the real world but create possible worlds in logical terms (that is, they are the logical 
expression of states of things more or less susceptible of becoming real [see Ronen, 1994: 
17-46]), their enunciation is still subject in many ways to real world. Thus, a more or less 
plausible scientific hypothesis would be that, according to the data available so far, some 
kind of microbial life could be found on a moon of Saturn. However, it would be impossible 
to accept as a serious scientific hypothesis that some kind of aliens dominate us in secret by 
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controlling the minds of our rulers. 
Scientific hypotheses and the rest of non-literary C-texts, despite creating worlds in 
their own enunciative display, are clearly bound by a series of conditions of verisimilitude 
and coherence dictated by the real world at a given moment and in a determined cultural 
community. 
However, fictional enunciation would be unique for being potentially free of any 
commitment to the real world. Or put in another way, by deploying a potentially unlimited 
textual poíesis. It is true that some fictional realistic text typologies can limit the degree of 
unreality of a work of fiction. Moreover, it is no less true that there are certain general 
postulates of fictional comprehension, such as the «principle of minimal departure» (Ryan, 
1991: 48-60 and Walton, 1990: 144-150), which in some way limit the unreality of a fictional 
text. But despite all this, fictional expression is potentially immune to any limitation or strict 
adaptation to the real world, as can be seen in fantasy genres or, to a greater extent, in the 
so-called «unnatural narratives». 
It is as a function of this radical singularity of fiction with respect to any other type 
of communicative modality that we propose to distinguish between «reality discourses» and 
«fiction discourses». Reality discourses would encompass the set of I-texts and C-texts that 
do not belong to the category of literary fiction, that is, they encompass the set of texts whose 
enunciation would in some way be subject to the criteria of plausibility and to the limitations 
of all kinds imposed by the real world. This would include many kinds of non-factual and 
non-real contents, from simple lies to scientific hypotheses or economic forecasts. On the 
other hand, fictional discourses would be those whose margin of expression of unreality 
would be potentially unlimited because they create with virtually complete freedom the 
conditions of existence of the contents they express. These kinds of texts deploy a virtually 




3. LITERARY FICTION AS A TEXTUAL PHENOMENON OF SIGNIFICATION 
 
In many ways, the different existing theories of fiction could be considered as 
attempts to explain how the aforementioned fictional textual poíesis, potentially unlimited, 
functions. Take as a reference the scheme of triple differentiation between factual and 
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fictional narratives proposed by Schaeffer (2013). The different semantic, pragmatic and 
syntactic approaches could be understood as descriptions of the radical singularity of 
fictional meaning generation. 
Our hypothesis is that, in order to describe properly the potentially unlimited 
character of fictional expression, it is not enough to inquire into aspects related to the three 
classical divisions of semiotics established by Morris (1938: 6). Instead, a previous instance 
should be looked into, the signification or primal instance of the formation of the sign. Our 
hypothesis is that fictional specificity, the point at which its potentially unlimited expression 
and poíesis first emerge (and then deploy their corresponding semiotic, pragmatic and 







CULTURALLY SANCTIONED SIGN USER
AND CODIFIED LINK
SINTACTICS
CONTENT PLANE SIGN SIGN
 
 
3.1. SIGNIFICATION AND THE ARBITRARY NATURE OF THE SIGNIFICATION 
LINK 
 
Here «signification» will be understood in the sense given by Umberto Eco in his 
famous work A Theory of Semiotics (1979). According to that author, signification is a codified 
and culturally sanctioned link that joins the two constituent functives of the semiotic function 
or sign, the «expression plane» and the «content plane» (1979: 48). For example, the 
signification link that constitutes the linguistic sign /fire/ is formed by the set of cultural 
conventions by which, in a concrete and culturally sanctioned code (in this case, the English 
language), the word «fire» (expression plane) refers to the concept fire (content plane). 
However, Eco underscores that the signification phenomenon happens not only at the level 
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of the individual sign, but also in «vast portions of discourse» (1979: 4). That is, it could be 
said that there is a level of micro signification and a level of macro signification that would 
operate in a more complex way, in texts. This latter type of signification is the one that 
interests us because literary fiction, as we have said, is fundamentally a textual phenomenon. 
In regard to this concept of signification, it is worth remembering the arbitrary 
nature of the link between the expression plane and the content plane of a sign. It is a 
circumstance that in the field of semiotics goes back at least to Saussure (1966: 65-71), and 
that would have as unequivocal proof the very wide verbal variety with which the different 
languages refer to identical referents. We say this because, ultimately, the fact that the link 
between the expression plane and content plane is arbitrary has resulted in the structural 
axiom that the linguistic sign is necessarily unable to predetermine the nature or exact 
meaning of the contents it expresses. 
In order to try to explain this we will use an argument a contrariis. A good example 
is an alarm pheromone secreted by an insect and detected by another of the same species. 
Beyond the fact that this is a type of communication based on «signals» instead of «signs» 
(1979: 19-21) and that there can be mistakes in interpretation, what this way of 
communication certainly does is to presuppose the real nature of the perceived danger. 
The insect that secretes the alarm pheromone may have detected the danger in a 
correct way, or maybe it was mistaken, and it is therefore a false alarm. It can also happen 
that the receptor insect correctly interprets such a pheromone and acts accordingly, or maybe 
it misinterprets the signal and acts erroneously. But from the point of view of the 
signification, the key point is that the mere fact of the secretion of an alarm pheromone 
implies that the communicational contents are absolutely real. In other words, 
communication through pheromones, beyond failures, misinterpretations or even 
deceptions, necessarily implies the factuality of the contents expressed. As a communicative 
element, the alarm pheromone implies the existence of an absolutely real and factual danger, 
without the possibility of double meanings, irony or fiction. 
However, the aforementioned constitutive arbitrariness of the linguistic sign is 
exactly the opposite of this necessary identification between expression plane and content 
plane seen in the exchanges of signals of information through pheromones. This is what 
follows from Eco's famous axiom according to which any sign that can be used to tell the 
truth can be also used to lie (that is, that a linguistic sign is incapable of presupposing the 
factuality of its contents, let alone its true character) (1979: 6-7). In this same sense, it is 
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possible to situate Derrida’s reflection in the context of his argument with Searle (Derrida, 
1988). According to the French theorist, with regard to speech acts, one cannot speak strictly 
about «serious» or «non-serious» uses of language since such considerations presuppose a 
stable and determined notion of context. And this is ultimately impossible since the notion of 
context is structurally variable (not «saturable») (Limited INC, 1988: 12). So, serious or non-
serious uses of language cannot be determined with absolute certainty. That is why Derrida, 
contrary to Searle’s opinion, defends that the sign itself is not predetermined to a serious use. 
A serious use is as consubstantial to the sign (an informative, factual and true phrase, such 
as «Paris is the capital of France») as another use considered not serious (a literary, fictional 
and empirically false phrase, such as «Once upon a time there was a world in which Rouen 
was the capital of France»). 
There is nothing, therefore, that presupposes the truth, facticity, precision, 
property, etc., of a linguistic content. Beyond its literal denotation, it could have a figurative, 
ironic or metacoded meaning, or it could be the fruit of the incoherent chatter of a madman 
or a drugged person… or it could express a state of things of a fictional world. 
Thus, in spite of all its possible defects and corruptions, in information exchanges 
of pheromones the signification link necessarily implies facticity, so they are unable to 
express fiction or any other non-serious language uses. However, in the case of linguistic 
signs, given that the expression-content link has an arbitrary character and can present a 
potentially infinite variability, chains of signs are in themselves just as focused on facticity as 
on fictionality. In short, the necessary (though not sufficient) condition of fiction is the 
arbitrary nature of the signification link. And this, in turn, necessarily results in sign’s inability 




3.2. SIGNIFICATION AT THE TEXTUAL LEVEL: DISCOURSE ACCORDING TO 
FOUCAULT 
 
Now then, and always from the point of view of signification, if the human 
linguistic sign is such a poorly defined communicative entity, how is it possible that we 
understand each other? If in itself the sign does not presuppose the factuality or the truth of 
the content to which it alludes, how is effective communication possible, and more so taking 
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into account that human interactions are usually based not on solitary signs, but on very long 
chains of signs, in texts? How is it possible not only that we normally know what our 
interlocutor is talking about, but above all in which exact terms he or she is doing it? Beyond 
the set of pragmatic norms that are generally taken for granted in the majority of 
communicative acts (Austin, 1955; Searle, 1969; Grice, 1967, etc.), the antidote to this 
fundamental indetermination of the chains of linguistic signs is what Van Dijk and Kintsch 
call «knowledge structures» (1983: 46-49). 
With this concept the authors refer to all those conventionalized schemes that guide 
the way through which we understand large groups of signs in different communicative 
situations. There are numerous types of knowledge structures. The «scripts» (Schank and 
Abelson, 1977), for example, determine what can be expected in communicative terms in 
everyday life situations such as going to the dentist or going out to dinner. For written texts, 
Van Dijk uses the term «superstructure», which he defines as «conventionalized schemata 
which provide the global “form” for the macrostructural “content” of a text» (1980: 127). 
An example of a superstructure could be the set of conventional pre-comprehension frames 
that a scientific article invokes, and that are completely different from those of a news story 
or a novel. 
In textual communication, perhaps the main knowledge structure is the discursive 
type. In this article, which explores fiction as a textual signification phenomenon, we have 
opted for Foucault's description of discourse in his work The Archeology of Knowledge (1969). 
There is a reason for taking Foucault’s conception of discourse instead of others 
that are more recent or specific to linguistics. And the reason is that it could be said that the 
French author, in spite of never using the term «signification» in the sense in which it is used 
here, assumes discourse as a predetermined way to signify. That is: Foucault conceives of 
discourse as a tremendously complex array of historically variable socio-cultural expressions 
and interactions that make a certain group of statements exist with a set of predetermined 
meaning properties. And this set of predetermined meaning properties starts, in semiotics 
terms, at the level of signification. 
For Foucault, a discourse is not what common sense more or less dictates, that is, 
a set of statements related to the same topic, or pronounced under the same point of view, 
or expressed by a specific group of people authorized to do so, or a group of texts which  
shares a series of stylistic features and conceptual categories. A discourse is all these things, 
but the enormous complexity and heterogeneity of the concept requires a series of specific 
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categories that the author constructs in The Archeology of Knowledge. According to Foucault, a 
discourse is the «principle of dispersion and distribution» of a specific set of statements 
(1972: 107). And the key point to this definition is the specific sense that the author gives to 
the term «statement». 
According to Foucault, a statement cannot be identified with culturally well-
established and discrete units (in the mathematical sense of the term «discrete») such as a 
grammatical sentence, a logical proposition or a speech act. Instead of corresponding to any 
of these prefixed categories, a statement is «a function that is exercised vertically in relation 
to these various units» (in reference to the phrase, the logical proposition and the speech act) 
(1972: 86). So the Foucaultian statement is a semiotic «function of existence» (1972: 86) that 
makes any chain of signs exist with a set of predetermined meaning properties. For Foucault, 
a statement is not something that can be assimilated or runs parallel to a sentence, a logical 
proposition or a speech act. A statement is what makes them be; what makes the sentence, 
logical proposition or speech act function as such. In this way, the statement is «a function 
that crosses [within language] a domain of possible structures and units and that makes them 
appear, with concrete contents, in space and time» (1972: 87). 
Consider medical discourse as an example. According to Foucault, medical 
discourse is not just what is said about medicine, or what doctors say, or a set of statements 
expressed in a certain style in which we can find terms and concepts such as «muscular 
elongation» or «asepsis». The author considers that, precisely because medical discourse is 
partially all these things, it is also a differentiated enunciative economy, a concrete way of 
inserting the chains of signs in the sense that goes far beyond the linguistic field. Thus, the 
medical discourse provides itself, through a series of processes and historical evolutions, with 
a series of proper values of truth and error; it establishes a certain order of social interactions 
(role of the patient, role of the doctor, role of the health authorities); it also constitutes a 
singular system of relations with other discourses. (In conjunction with the legal discourse, 
for instance, it creates objects such as sick leave), etc. 
For all these reasons, the difference between finding the word «infarct» in a medical 
record or in the headline in a sports chronicle is not only semantic. It is not just that in one 
case it refers to a real health situation and in the other case it is a metaphorical use to express 
a great emotion. The real difference is that, in the case of the medical record, the word 
«infarct» involves a series of processes to establish values of truth and error, protocols and 
obligations for the patient and doctor, legal and labor implications, etc., which do not take 
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place in the second case. 
Foucault's theorizing about this enunciative level is extensive and complex. It 
includes concepts such as «referential» (1972: 91) or «enunciative function» (1972: 88-105) 
which cannot be explained here for reasons of space. However, what we want to emphasize 
here is that, in Foucault's thought, the discourse or singular mode of establishing a set of 
predetermined meaning properties for a group of statements goes far beyond the linguistic 
field and is constituted as a differentiated dynamic of manifestations and socio-cultural 
interactions. And the key point is that these socio-cultural interactions are completely real. 
So, regardless of whether a statement or set of statements that belong to a particular 
discourse can be false, what always will be real is the set of socio-cultural interactions that 
insert those false contents into the general economy of meaning. 
Thus, a false legal statement can be expressed («ignorance of the law exempts one 
from compliance of the same»), but this does not eliminate the vast set of real socio-cultural 
interactions that the concept «legal discourse» implies. The statement’s contents could be 
false according to certain lie and truth values established by legal discourse, but the entire 
structure of meaning generation, based on a series of real historical and cultural interactions, 
remains fully valid. As is the case with «reality discourses», (which, as was seen in point 3, 
also covered lies and unproven hypotheses), it could be said that the socio-cultural 
interactions which determine the specific mode of meaning generation of a discourse are 
«reality interactions». The way they create meaning will always have a correlate of real socio-
cultural processes, an unavoidable subjection to real world. 
 
 
3.3. THE STRUCTURAL DIFFERENCE BETWEEN FICTIONAL AND NON-
FICTIONAL DISCOURSES: SIGNIFICATION AS A NORM VS. SIGNIFICATION AS MANAGING A 
POTENTIAL 
 
Before proceeding to explain the fundamental thesis of this article it is necessary to 
make a brief review of what has already been pointed out. First, based on a seemingly trivial 
sentence by Searle, we have established the premise that a fundamental structural difference 
between fiction and nonfiction is that the former has a potentially unlimited (textual) 
expression, while in the latter the expression always has some kind of limit. Then we argued 
that this potential absence of limits of fictional expression can be translated into a potentially 
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unlimited textual poíesis, in the sense that fiction is capable of creating its own structures of 
meaning with virtually total independence from the real world. Finally, in the different 
sections of point 4 we have tried to defend that the primary semiotic correlate of this 
singularity of fictional expression is at the level of signification, understood in the way of 
Umberto Eco. In 4.1 it was affirmed that the necessary (though not sufficient) condition of 
fiction is the inability of the signification link to clearly and unambiguously determine the 
nature of the content alluded to. And in 4.2 it was explained that the antidote against this 
radical indetermination of the chains of signs are the predetermined and conventionalized 
understanding schemata called «knowledge structures». In the case of textual 
communication, the most important of these knowledge structures are the different 
discourse types. And in order to link this with our initial premise, which conceives literary 
fiction as a textual signification phenomenon, we chose the Foucaultian conception of 
discourse. According to Foucault, a discourse is a predetermined way of signifying. 
Discourses are described as differentiated systems of predetermining the way in which, 
within the texts, expression planes allude to content planes. Finally, the different discourses, 
beyond the linguistic field, are based on a series of historically variable and completely real 
socio-cultural interactions. 
Now that the fundamental premises of the argument have been summarized, the 
fundamental thesis of this article can finally be explained. And this is none other than that 
the potentially infinite expression of fiction necessarily demands a singular mode of 
signification. As we have seen, non-fictional discourses or «reality discourses» signify 
according to a series of norms that ultimately depend on some kind of systematic subjection 
to real world. Thus, the real world stands as a premise and a basic guiding principle of its 
signification. But in fiction, this dependence on the real world is much more uncertain. It is 
true that fictional worlds, by virtue of certain general principles such as mimesis or the 
aforementioned «principle of minimal departure», take the real world as their base. But the 
way in which its signification is subject to the real world can never be adjusted to a systematic 
scheme. 
Thus, the difference between fiction and nonfiction is not the difference that exists 
between a discourse with systematic rules of signification (an article of inorganic chemistry) 
from another which does not have them (a science-fiction novel). The issue does not fit into 
an axis of normative rigidity-normative flexibility. What really points toward the infinite potential 
expression of fiction is that it exceeds the normative framework of the rule. Fiction, despite 
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taking the real world as a foundation, does so in such a non-systematic way that it is not 
possible to capture it through rules. The fact that every fictional work establishes with 
potentially absolute freedom 
 
a) its own architecture of modal reality systems (Doležel, 1998: 113-132), and 
b) its own pragmatic communicational structures (Adams, 1985: 9-14), 
 
prevents its signification from being explained only by norms. 
But if fictional signification cannot be explained through norms alone, how can it 
be explained? Our proposal is that fictional signification is not governed by more or less 
predetermined norms, however flexible they may be. Fiction simply manages the 
signification link as if it were a potential. In fiction there is no real world from which to 
obtain restrictive meaning construction rules, so it has to construct in each text (and 
potentially, in each extract of each text) the way it means. What ultimately denotes the fact 
that any text whatever can potentially occur in a work of fiction is that the foundational 
expression-content link does not have a predetermined model. Instead, it must be managed 
flexibly as a potential of meaning generation. 
 
Figure 2 
- SIGN IN NON-FICTION DISCOURSE
EXPRESSION SIGNIFICATION CONTENT
PREDETERMINED RULES
- SIGN IN FICTIONAL DISCOURSE
EXPRESSION SIGNIFICATION CONTENT
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According to this scheme, fictional texts do not signify in a predetermined way, like 
reality discourses do. They are able to potentially manage at every moment (and potentially 
in an unlimited way) how they signify. By this, we mean not only polysemy, or the fact that 
fictional texts have a greater semantic richness than non-fiction texts in terms of a greater 
presence of connotations or metaphorical meanings. What we really mean to say is that the 
worlds created by the fictional poiesis do not only have a real existence in ontological terms, 
but they also lack that dense accumulation of real social interactions that articulate meaning 
creation in non-fiction discourses. 
It is true that fiction, through basic principles like mimesis or a series of schemata 
of meaning prefiguration such as literary genres, do not build their meaning from scratch. In 
fiction there are certain predetermined signification frames that are always in force. However, 
the potentially absolute independence of fiction with respect to the real world makes its rules 
of signification structurally unstable. That is why fictional signification is not ruled by norms, 
which will always be exceeded, and works instead as a potential that has to be managed. 
Let us look at an example taken from a not particularly avant-garde work, Michel 
Houellebecq’s novel Les Particules élémentaires (1998). Even beyond the fact that the novel has 
a science-fiction theme or that it uses typically fictional resources such as multi-
perspectivism, the fictionality of the text would be explained through the variety of 
signification levels it has. Thus, there are two major poles of signification in the work. The 
first, the story declared as fictional (that is, metafictional) of a biographer of the future who 
tells the story of the two protagonists, the half-brothers Michel and Bruno. And the second, 
the texts of the prologue and the epilogue. In these, someone who is apparently the same 
historian of the future narrates in a supposedly factual way the events that enabled the genetic 
manipulations that made possible a new humanity. In both main instances of signification, 
moreover, there are important variations. In the first case, for example, passages like the 
following one, in which the experience of Bruno in a swinger club is narrated,  
 
With his five-inch cock and his inability to maintain an erection 
between orgasms (he had never really been able to sustain one for any length of 
time, except perhaps as a teenager, and the time between ejaculations had grown 
considerable since then: he wasn’t getting any younger), Bruno wasn’t really in 
his element in such places (Houellebecq, 1998: 202). 
 
Contrast with metatextual reflections such as the following: 
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The story of a life can be as long or as short as the teller wishes. Whether the life 
is tragic or enlightened, the classic gravestone inscription marking simply the 
dates of birth and death has, in its brevity, much to recommend it. However, in 
the case of Martin Ceccaldi, it seems appropriate to set his life in a socioeconomic 
context, to say less about the individual than the society of which he is 
symptomatic. Carried forward by the sweep of history and their determination 
to be a part of it, symptomatic individuals lead lives which are, in the main, happy 
and uncomplicated. A couple of pages are sufficient to summarize such a life 
(1998: 20).  
 
On the other hand, the (fictional) historical narration of the prologue, in which the 
narrator theorizes about the nature of the paradigm changes that from time to time occur 
throughout human history:  
 
Metaphysical mutations —that is to say radical, global transformations in the 
values to which the majority subscribe— are rare in the history of humanity. The 
rise of Christianity can be cited as an example (1998: 4). 
 
Ends with what looks like an epic poem: 
 
We live today under a new world order, 
The web which weaves together all things envelops our 
 bodies, 
Bathes our limbs, 
In a halo of joy. 
A state to which men of old sometimes acceded through 
 music 
Greets us each morning as a common place (1998: 5). 
 
These are isolated examples taken from a specific work. However, it would not be 
difficult to find similar examples in any work of fiction. Novels and short stories enable 
multiple meaning planes in which this plurality and heterogeneity of signification positions 
are common and overlap each other without any difficulty, which allows them easily to 
assume any textual content. Again, one could posit whether any textual content would be 






Searle wrote the phrase that served as the starting point to this article («[...] and 
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since any sentence whatever can occur in a work of fiction») when developing an argument 
about a possible differentiated signification in fiction. Indeed, for Searle, the problem of how 
it is possible for fiction to be intelligible and have meaning despite breaking the rules that 
govern illocutionary acts takes the form of a significant «paradox»:  
 
We might put the problem in the form of a paradox: how can it be 
both the case that words and other elements in a fictional story have their 
ordinary meanings and yet the rules that attach to those words and other 
elements and determine their meanings are not complied with: how can it be the 
case in "Little Red Riding Hood" both that "red" means red and yet that the rules 
correlating "red" with red are not in force?” (Searle, 1975: 319). 
 
The author’s answer to this question is well known. It is not that the pragmatic 
norms that link the expression plane («red») with concept plane (the concept of red) are not 
in force in fiction. It is just that, according to the author, in fiction signification works in 
terms of illocutionary pretense. Fictional speech acts are not essentially different from non-
fiction speech acts. The former just pretends to have the genuine illocutionary force of the 
latter.  
As we have seen throughout this article, our proposal also starts at the basic level 
of signification. However, the main premise defended here is that the singularity of fictional 
signification cannot be translated in terms of rules capable of predetermining how a text 
signifies. The basic motive, as we have seen, is the potentially unlimited character of fictional 
signification. How could the potential infinity of fictional expression be represented in the 
form of a normative predetermination scheme? How could the fact that any text whatever is 
likely to occur in fiction be systematized through rules? Where could one find, in fiction, a 
vast series of real and historically variable cultural interactions, which, according to Foucault, 
are the necessary premises of all discourse? 
As seen in figure 2, the reason that explains the absolute potential of fictional 
expression is its potentially absolute control over the way it signifies. Or to put it more 
simply: in every text, and potentially in every single passage of every text, fiction has the 
ability to decide in what terms it creates meaning. And this, in its primary semiotic correlate, 
is identified with the signification mode. In fiction, signification is not a set of rules that 
predetermine the way in which, at the textual level, the expression plane alludes to the 
content plane, as it is in the rest of discourses. Instead, in fiction, such a link is handled as a 
potential that can be manipulated in a potentially unlimited way. If any text whatever is likely 
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to occur in fiction it is just because fictional texts, free from virtually any link to the real 
world, have a potentially unlimited control over the way they signify. 
According to a phrase commonly attributed to Truman Capote, the problem with 
living outside the law is that you no longer have its protection. Something similar could be 
said about the difference between fictional signification and the signification of the rest of 
discourses. As seen in 4.1, the expression-content signification link is arbitrary. And as has 
been defended in 4.2, a discourse is a way of controlling (always at a textual level) such 
arbitrariness in order to prefigure the general sense of a series of chains of signs. Fiction, by 
managing the primary signification link as potential, would simply assume that consubstantial 
semiotic instability and would create its textual contents with potentially total freedom. This 
would place fiction outside the ordinary discursive laws, which fix the conditions according 
to which a text signifies in terms of a series of attachments to the real world. However, given 
that fiction lives outside these laws, it also lives (in signification terms) outside its protection. 
The fictional signification link will be always unstable, or what is the same: fiction will never 
be able to fully determine in what terms, in its texts, expression planes allude to content 
planes. 
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